The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its Own by Park, Roger C.
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 16 
Issue 1 Vol. 16 Iss. 1 Article 9 
1996 
The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its Own 
Roger C. Park 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
16 Miss. C. L. Rev. 125 (1995-1996) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
THE DEFINITION OF HEARSAY: To EACH ITS OWN
Roger C. Park*
I.
In thinking about how hearsay should be defined, I believe it useful to distin-
guish between assertion-oriented and declarant-oriented definitions of hearsay.
An example of an assertion-oriented definition is one that defines an act or utter-
ance as hearsay if it is assertive and is offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted. An example of a declarant-oriented definition is one that defines an
act or utterance as hearsay if it is offered for an inference about a belief of the
declarant. The declarant-oriented approach could also be called "dangers analy-
sis" because it classifies evidence as hearsay when the proposed use of the evi-
dence would expose the trier to dangers of reliance on the declarant's unexam-
ined memory, perception, narrative ability,1 or sincerity.
Some authors have treated these two definitions as functional equivalents,2 but
I think that there is a difference between them. My favorite illustration is the
utterance offered as a falsehood. Suppose that the prosecution seeks to prove a
crime partly by showing efforts at a cover-up.' The cover-up stories, offered by
the prosecution as falsehoods, are not hearsay under an assertion-oriented defini-
tion because they are not offered to show the truth of any assertion they contain.
In contrast, the cover-up utterances would be hearsay under a modestly strong
declarant-oriented definition. They depend for value upon the declarant's memo-
ry, perception, and narrative ability; moreover, there is a significant danger of
mistake in inferring belief from action.
There are weak and strong versions of the two approaches to defining hearsay.
A jurist applying a strong version of the assertion-oriented approach is likely to
focus upon what an utterance "literally" asserts. This focus can lead to distinc-
tions that have no basis in hearsay policy, because arbitrary differences in the
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California. I am grateful to
Daniel A. Farber for insights and suggestions.
1. When the declarant's conduct is verbal, the "narrative ability" danger is that defects or peculiarities in
the declarant's verbal expression will cause the trier to misunderstand the declarant's belief. When the chal-
lenged evidence is nonverbal conduct, there is a cognate danger of ambiguity of inference from conduct to the
actor's belief.
2. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246, at 584 (Edward W Cleary ed., 2d ed.
1972), criticized in Roger C. Park, McCormick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay, 65 MINN. L. REV. 423
(1981). The treatise seems to have abandoned this view in later editions. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 246 (John W Strong, et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992) (setting forth the assertion-centered definition of the Federal
Rules and omitting the claim that when utterances are not offered for their truth, they do not depend for value
on the credibility of the declarant) and id. § 250, at 435 ("[a]t this point it is apparent from the treatment of
what is and what is not hearsay that the definition of hearsay previously advanced is less inclusive than the logi-
cal and analytical possibilities would allow.").
3. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219-20 (1974) (holding evidence of co-conspirators' false
testimony at prior proceeding not hearsay when offered against defendant because not offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted). Cf United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 1980) (co-defendant's false
denial of acquaintance with defendant admissible to show defendant's guilt).
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wording of a verbal utterance can determine whether the utterance is classified as
hearsay. Weaker versions of the assertion-oriented definition seek to avoid this
problem by taking into account whether a difference in the form of an utterance
is likely to make a difference in the hearsay dangers it presents, or by taking a
broad view of the intent of the declarant in deciding what an utterance asserts.
As noted below, weaker versions of the declarant-oriented approach overlook
hearsay dangers when they are minimal. The weaker versions of the two
approaches tend to converge, though their difference in focus may still nudge
jurists in different directions in some situations - for example, in classifying the
intercepted requests for criminal activity involved in Regina v. Kearley,4 or in
dealing with the example of an utterance offered as a falsehood described above.
The assertion-oriented approach to defining hearsay is as workable as any. It
points quickly to the right solution in easy cases - for example, the case in
which a statement is offered solely to explain the subsequent conduct of the hear-
er. No other definition is likely to do much better. Therefore, I believe there is
no need to change American codifications, such as the Federal Rules of
Evidence, to adopt a declarant-oriented approach like that endorsed in Wright v.
Tatham5 and apparently reaffirmed in Kearley.6 A declarant-oriented definition
is less handy as a courtroom formula, is not needed to guard against injustice,
and is just as indeterminate in hard cases as an assertion-oriented approach.
The indeterminacy of a declarant-oriented definition stems from the fact that
the definition goes too far unless practical limits are placed upon its operation.
Under the strongest form of the definition's dangers analysis, testimony would be
hearsay if it required the trier to rely to any degree upon the accuracy of an out-
of-court declarant or if the value of the testimony would be reduced by any
amount by a mistake in the inference from act or utterance to belief. Testimony
by a witness who saw an actor open an umbrella, offered to show that it was rain-
ing, would be hearsay because its value depends on the accuracy of a belief
imputed to the umbrella-opener. Testimony that the witness looked at the court-
house clock and saw that it was 3:00 would be hearsay because it depends on the
credibility of the clock-setter. A disquisition on the laws of physics would be
hearsay when offered to show that the declarant understood physics because of
4. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
5. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
6. Kearley reached a result consistent with a declarant-oriented approach without expressly rejecting the
"truth of the matter asserted" formula. See Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 246, 255 (Bridge and Ackner). For example,
after stating that both "implied" and "express" assertions are hearsay, Lord Ackner added that in Kearley, "Itihe
object of tendering the evidence would be to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement." Id. at
255. The scope of this "implied assertion" concept is unclear. In Lord Ackner's usage, it appears that an utter-
ance is offered to prove its "implied assertion" even when the author of the utterance was not aware that the
utterance might be useful in inferring the fact sought to be proven, so long as the proponent proposes that the
utterance be used for an inference about a fact believed by the author.
Kearley conveys the message that "implied assertions" are hearsay, but does not give much guidance on the
difference between use of an utterance for its "implied assertion" and use of an utterance in some other fashion
for an inference about the state of mind of the declarant. Apparently the latter is sometimes permitted because
Kearley does not overturn Ratten v. Regina, 3 All E.R. 801 (P.C. 1971). See Lord Ackner's speech at Kearley, 2
App. Cas. at 252.
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the possibility of lucky guesses or a memorized script. Testimony of an in-court
witness about her own age would be hearsay because it depends on the credibili-
ty of declarants who told her the date of her birth. Testimony by an in-court wit-
ness that she saw an umbrella, offered solely to show that she did see an umbrel-
la, would also be hearsay because it depends on the credibility of the out-of-court
declarants who taught the witness how to know an umbrella. Carried to its logi-
cal extreme, dangers analysis would make all testimonial evidence hearsay.7 To
avoid absurdity one needs to adopt a weaker form of dangers analysis, one that
overlooks minor reliance upon the memory, perception, sincerity, or narrative
ability of an out-of-court declarant.
This weaker variety of dangers analysis has a degree of indeterminacy and
requires situationally specific judgments about hearsay policy (as does any other
attempt to apply the hearsay rule). A declarant's statement describing a location
in exquisite detail might be deemed not to be hearsay when offered to show that
the declarant had been to the location, at least if there was no evidence that the
declarant had heard a description from some other source.8 The description
might be considered hearsay when it was less detailed or when there was a sig-
nificant chance that the declarant had heard someone else describe the location.
A name listed in an address book might be considered nonhearsay when offered
to show association between the owner of the book and the person named,9 but
the name on the front of the book might be considered hearsay when offered to
show who owned the book." Traditional categories of nonhearsay, such as prior
statements offered to impeach and statements that have operative effect when
accompanied by a certain subjective intent, would be deemed not to be hearsay
despite the existence of some hearsay dangers. Testimony about statements made
by many independent declarants might be considered hearsay even if the state-
7. Cf Mary Morton, The Hearsay Rule and Epistemological Suicide, 74 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1305-07 (1986).
8. See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 250, at 436 (arguing that a statement describing a
house does not depend for value on declarant's observation, memory, or veracity when offered to show that the
declarant had visited the house).
9 Cf United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 267 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969 (1977) (hold-
ing names mentioned in telephone conversation not hearsay when used to show association).
10. At least one adherent of the declarant-oriented approach would classify as hearsay (noting that "all four
hearsay risks are present") evidence that the defendant's name was on a briefcase name tag, when the evidence
is offered to show that the briefcase belonged to the defendant. See Michael Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay":
A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 906-22 (criticiz-
ing United States v. Snow, 517 E2d 441 (9th Cir. 1975)). On the other hand, one Court of Appeal did not find
Wright v. Tatham an obstacle to holding that a paper containing the words "Sean rules," found near the scene of
criminal activity, was not hearsay when used to show that Sean had been at the scene. See Regina v. Lydon, 85
Crim. App. 221 (1987); cf Regina v. Rice, 1 All E.R. 832 (Q.B. 1963) (used airline ticket bearing Rice's name
admissible to show he took the flight). But see Patel v. Comptroller of Customs, 1966 App. Cas. 356 (PC.)
(inscription "Produce of Morocco" on seed bags hearsay when offered to show place where seeds originated).
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ments strongly corroborated each other," or even if they linked with other evi-
dence in a way that practically excluded the possibility that they were
inaccurate.12
All those examples to some degree require inferences about the declarant's
state of mind and depend for value to some degree on the credibility of the
declarant. 3 The weaker form of the declarant-oriented analysis does not give us
instant answers in any of those situations. Nor do its answers come from a rea-
soning process in which the analyst identifies a conceivable danger and then
deduces that the evidence is hearsay. The answers come from tradition and from
a situationally-specific judgment about the pros and cons of admitting the evi-
dence.
Any definition of hearsay that purports to explain what courts have done will
break down at some point. The purposes of the hearsay rule are manifold and the
constellations of evidence are infinite, so it is impossible to draw sharp a priori
lines. One encounters diminishing returns very quickly when one tries to refine
the definition of hearsay to guide judges in the borderland.
For jurisdictions now governed by codes defining hearsay as a statement
"offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted," I believe there is
little to be gained by trying to change the definition to clarify its application in
borderline cases. Interpreters of the definition should apply a few basic princi-
ples and leave it at that. First, they should not give the words of the definition a
meaning they will not bear, or, put in another way, they should not interpret the
definition in a way that clearly violates conventions of language in the lawyer-
judge interpretive community. Thus, an utterance offered as a falsehood is not
offered for the truth of its assertion. Second, in choosing between meanings that
the words will bear, jurists should not create formalistic distinctions that are
unrelated to any likely policy aim of the hearsay ban. Thus, the sarcastic state-
ment "At least I never forged a will" should be considered hearsay when offered
to show that the person addressed forged a will. No purpose would be served by
treating the sarcastic statement differently from the direct statement "You forged
a will."
11. Cf Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 273 (H.L. Eng. 1992) (Oliver) ("cumulative beliefs" of many
callers no more admissible than statement of single caller).
12. For example, suppose that an accused child abuser claims that he never disrobed in front of the child.
The child says he did disrobe in her presence, and that she saw a distinctive scar. Then police discover that
defendant did have that scar, at a location that could only be seen when the defendant was naked. The conjoin-
ing of the evidence practically eliminates the possibility that the child was inaccurate, especially if the accused
was previously a stranger to the child so that she was not likely to have learned of the scar from another person.
But the majority in Idaho v. Wright was apparently willing to let such statements be excluded as constitutionally
impermissible hearsay, or at least did not answer the dissent's claim that this result followed from the majority's
reasoning. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 828-29 (1990) (unanswered scar hypothetical of the dissent).
13. The use of prior statements to impeach involves hearsay dangers under a strict analysis because one
must infer something about the state of mind of an out-of-court declarant who was not subject to cross-exami-
nation at the time of making the statement. The degree to which the statement has value for impeachment pur-
poses depends on one's inference about the declarant's state of mind while making the statement used for
impeachment. If one infers that he was sincere at the time of the prior statement it strongly impeaches the trial
testimony. If one infers that he merely misspoke when making the prior statement, its impeachment value is
minimal. The use of statements that have operative effect only when accompanied by a certain subjective intent
incurs hearsay dangers because it also requires an inference about the state of mind of the declarant, for exam-
ple, an inference that the declarant intended a gift when he announced a gift.
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In the borderland areas where neither of the two principles stated above apply,
courts should reach the result that they believe best serves the various purposes
of the hearsay rule in the context of the particular situation. Then subsequent
interpreters can use that situationally-specific precedent to help make an
irrefutably open-textured definition more predictable in practice.
Testimony about intercepted requests to drug dealers falls in the borderland. It
is not a violation of ordinary conventions of language to say that the requests are
nonassertive or that they are not offered to prove the truth of any assertions they
contain. Moreover, to treat them as nonhearsay does not create a distinction
without a difference. Evidence that the declarant called a defendant's home to
request drugs, apparently unaware that he or she was addressing a police officer,
raises fewer dangers than evidence that a declarant reported to police that defen-
dant was a drug dealer. There is less danger of insincerity and less reason to fear
a strategic decision by the prosecutor to offer hearsay in lieu of live testimony.14
So in jurisdictions that follow an assertion-oriented definition I think it is reason-
able to rule that the statements are not hearsay. That bit of precedent, once estab-
lished, is not particularly hard to apply in later cases involving intercepted
requests to drug dealers, bookmakers, and pornographers.
That does not mean that the Kearley majority erred in its treatment of the defi-
nition of hearsay. Given the precedent of Wright v. Tatham, it was reasonable to
classify as hearsay an intercepted request to buy drugs. There is nothing illogical
or unfair about that interpretation of Wright v. Tatham's declarant-oriented
approach. The statements offered in Kearley did depend for value to some
degree upon the credibility of the declarants. A moderately strong "dangers
analysis" leads to classification as hearsay. Moreover, the declarant-oriented def-
inition, while it does not accomplish miracles of clarification, does have the
advantage of focusing attention on dangers that are highly relevant to the ques-
tion whether hearsay ought to be received.
In short, to each its own. Precedent ought to be followed unless there is a rea-
son to depart from it. Once a hearsay definition is in place, not much is to be
gained by changing it for purposes of settling something about the class of cases
that have been called "implied assertions."15 It is better to apply situation-sense
to the particular problem presented by the specific configuration of facts.
14. The effect of exclusion of evidence on prosecutorial conduct is an important factor in the formulation of
constitutionalized hearsay doctrine. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 557 (1992); Roger W. Kirst, The
Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REv. 485 (1987). I think it should be considered
in formulating all hearsay doctrine.
15. As Professor Christopher B. Mueller has noted in Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 367, 418 n.153 (1992), hearsay writers use the term "implied assertion" in an
odd way. In most discourse, when one says that a speaker "implied" a proposition, one means that the speaker
intended to convey the proposition (albeit in a veiled way) rather than merely that someone else can use the
speaker's words for an indirect inference about the speaker's state of mind. But in the context of writing about
hearsay, the phrase "implied assertion" is used to embrace acts and utterances whose author did not intend to
assert the proposition that the proponent seeks to prove.
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The feature of the House of Lords hearsay doctrine that seems most foreign to
me - in Kearley and in Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions16 - is the pro-
nouncement that the door is closed on judicial creation of new exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Common-law rules ordinarily come with a repair warranty. A
judge-made rule is mended with judge-made exceptions. Judicial law-making of
this nature does not overrule precedent unless the exceptions destroy the rule. A
rule creating a fiew category of admissible hearsay would merely add detail to
the general principle that hearsay is admissible when it is not too dangerous.
None of the most obvious reasons for judicial withdrawal apply in the situation
presented by Myers and Kearley. There had been no all-embracing preemptive
codification. No one made commitments or changed institutional arrangements
in reliance on prior law. Moreover, no other institution is better fitted to do the
repair. Courts are as competent to make law on evidence and trial procedure as a
legislative body.
The "make do and mend" approach derogated in Kearley and Myers7 seems to
me a desirable exercise in practical reason, a sensible avoidance of the tempta-
tions of reductionism and foundationalism. There's nothing wrong with small
improvements. Hearsay is a good arena for makers-do and menders.
There may be institutional considerations that, as an American, I simply do not
understand. But it seems to me that the House of Lords took a wrong turn in
Myers, and thereby deprived itself of the option of doing the sensible thing in
Kearley. Free of the Myers precedent, the Kearley Court could still have said
that the intercepted requests were hearsay but then could have created an excep-
tion that let the utterances into evidence. The exception could have -been a nar-
row one. It could have required that there be evidence of multiple requests. The
details would not have been hard to work out or very important.
Perhaps the House of Lords is simply too great a body to hear appeal after
appeal from supplicants asking for new hearsay exceptions. If so, it is unfortu-
nate that there was not at hand a third way to mend the hearsay rule. The
predicament of the Lords in Myers and Kearley suggests that the enabling-act
process under which an advisory committee proposes and a judicial body pro-
mulgates is a desirable supplement to legislation and adjudication.
16. 1965 App. Cas. 1001 (H.L. Eng.). For a cogent criticism of Myers on grounds that its restriction on the
creation of new exceptions to the hearsay rule may lead to distortion of other areas of the law, see COLIN
TAPPER, CROSS ON EVIDENCE 520 (7th Ed. 1990).
17. "A policy of make do and mend is no longer adequate." Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 250 (H.L.
Eng. 1992).
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II.
In the preceding section I suggested a general approach for jurisdictions that
apply the assertion-oriented definition of the Federal Rules of Evidence. I am
not sure that further attempts to refine or elaborate the assertion-oriented defini-
tion do much good. Nonetheless, I will try my hand at it. Suppose a hearsay
objection to a verbal assertion.18 Let PF be the fact the proponent proposes to
have the trier of fact infer from the declarant's words. When the proponent asks
the trier to believe that the declarant desired to send the message PF with the
words, the utterance is hearsay whatever its form. When it appears likely that the
declarant was aware that someone would find the declarant's words useful in
inferring or remembering PF, then the utterance is also hearsay. When the pro-
ponent was apparently unaware that the utterance might be useful to infer or
remember PF, then the words are not hearsay because they are not offered for the
truth of any assertion they contain.
Under that formulation, an utterance offered as a falsehood would not be
hearsay. The declarant apparently expected the auditors to infer the opposite of
the fact sought to be proven. In contrast, the utterance "Harold is the finest of
my sons" would be hearsay when offered to show that the declarant was fond of
Harold.19 The declarant would have expected the auditors to draw an inference
of fondness from the statement. The intercepted utterance "Put $5 on Nick's
Arrival in the 5th" would not be hearsay when offered to show that the intended
addressee was a bookmaker. Unless one assumes unusual facts, the declarant
would not have thought that the utterance provided information that anyone
would find useful in drawing an inference about the addressee's status as a book-
maker. The declarant took that status for granted, and assumed that the addressee
would also take it for granted. In other words, he was not communicating or
asserting that the addressee was a bookmaker. He was communicating some-
thing else on the basis of an assumption about that status.
Perhaps the concepts in this section would be helpful to judges, perhaps not.
Even without extra guidance, judges appear to have been able to reach reason-
able results in "implied assertion" cases decided in jurisdictions that define
hearsay as a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The
reported case law does not contain any obvious injustices, much less any ago-
nized calls for reform by judges who felt helpless in the face of an arbitrary rule.
The little clusters of precedent provide intelligible guidance for commonly recur-
ring situations. There is uncertainty, but at a tolerable level. Uncertainties about
when grand jury testimony is admissible under the residual exception, or the
degree to which experts may be used as a conduit for hearsay, cause practitioners
and judges to lose far more sleep than the "implied assertion" puzzle.
18. I would construe the requirement of an "assertion" to mean that legally operative language offered solely
to show the legal relationship created by the language is not hearsay because the language is not being offered
to prove anything it "asserts."
19. For the history of the "Harold" hypothetical, see Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal Reasoning, 47
VAND. L. REv. 43, 45 n.8 (1994).
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III.
One cannot expect too much from a definition of hearsay. I have suggested
that the declarant-oriented definition has a large measure of indeterminacy. So
does the assertion-oriented definition. There never will be one that completely
avoids puzzles and perplexities, especially in the world of hypotheticals.
For example, one can hypothesize situations in which an utterance would not
be hearsay under Rule 801(c)2" even though it is offered to prove what it "literal-
ly '21 asserts. Suppose that C and M agree that the sentence "You are competent
to make a will" will be taken between them to mean "The cocaine is in the lock-
er." Given that code, C's subsequent statement to M "You are competent to make
a will" would arguably not be hearsay when offered as evidence that M was com-
petent to make a will. C's real message would have been that the cocaine was in
the locker, and the proponent would arguably be asking that the message be used
circumstantially for the inference of competence.
I am not entirely happy with the guidance that Federal Rule 801(c) gives in that
hypothetical, or for that matter in the situation presented by Wright v. Tatham.
But so far as I know the hypothetical has never arisen and Wright v. Tatham has
happened only once, so I would not reject a generally good guide because it
might sometimes fall short.
IV
Christopher Mueller has suggested that the concept of performatives is helpful
in refining our understanding of the definition of hearsay in situations such as
that presented by Kearley.22
The concept of performative utterances 23 is indeed helpful in explaining the
law's treatment of legally operative language. Suppose that the proponent offers
the utterance "I accept your offer" to show acceptance of a contract offer. A
hearsay novice might think that the statement is offered for the truth of what it
20. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
21. The concept of "literal" meaning is itself a rather confusing and indeterminate one. I mean to evoke the
notion that, by using one's background knowledge about the way words are commonly used and by taking only
a shallow look at context, one can often assign a surface meaning to a word or sentence. Compare ERVING
GOFFMAN, FORMS OF TALK 64-65 n.39 (1981) (" 'Literal' here is a wonderfully confusing notion, something that
should constitute a topic of linguistic study, not a conceptual tool in making studies. Sometimes the dictionary
meaning of one or more of the words of the utterance is meant, although how that meaning is arrived at is left
an open question. And the underlying, commonsense notion is preserved that a word in isolation will have a
general, basic, or most down-to-earth meaning, that this basic meaning is sustained in how the word is com-
monly used in phrases and clauses, but that in many cases words are used 'metaphorically' to convey something
that they don't really mean.").
22. Mueller, supra note 15, at 416-22.
23. I first encountered the phrase "performative utterance" in J.L. Austin's work. See J.L. AUSTIN, How TO
Do THINGS WITH WORDS 5-6 (JO. Urmson & Marina Sbisa eds., 2d ed. 1975). To Austin, performative utter-
ances "do not 'describe' or 'report' or state anything at all, are not 'true or false' "; and "the uttering of the sen-
tence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as, or as 'just,' say-
ing something." Id. At the time, I wondered how anyone other than a hearsay buff could be interested in the
subject. Now I am beginning to think that it belongs to philosophers.
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asserts. One way of explaining why the language is not hearsay is to say that it is
not assertive but performative. The words are not offered for what they say, but
for what they do.
It is easy to see why performative utterances are exempt from the hearsay ban
when they are offered to show their operative effect. When the utterance "I
accept your offer" is offered to show that the offer was accepted, the mere fact
that the statement was made changed the legal relationship of the parties. No
significant issues of hearsay policy are raised by allowing the evidence to come
in without further examination.
An utterance can have both a performative aspect and an assertive aspect. For
example, allegations in pleadings are both performative and assertive. Suppose
that plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant manufactured a faulty valve.
When the utterance is offered to show its legally operative effect (plaintiff is enti-
tled to mandatory disclosure about valves and may produce evidence about them
at trial) then the utterance is not hearsay. When the utterance is offered assertive-
ly to show that defendant indeed made a faulty valve, then it is hearsay.
Professor Mueller, using an inclusive concept of "performative," has argued
that we should realize that all utterances have both performative and assertive
aspects, and that they may be both performative and assertive even when offered
for a single purpose. 24 He has suggested that the performative aspects of utter-
ances can be a basis for holding that they are not hearsay even when they are
offered for some purpose other than showing their operative effect.25
I have reservations about his approach. I would prefer to say that performative
utterances are hearsay except when they are offered for the purpose of showing
their legally operative effect. In my view, if a performative utterance is offered to
show its operative effect - to show a change in legal rights, duties, powers, priv-
ileges, or disabilities wrought by the utterance itself- then it is not hearsay; but
if it is offered to invite an inference about a fact believed by the declarant, then
its performative aspect does not save it from being hearsay. Thus, evidence of a
judgment of conviction is not hearsay when offered to show the convicted per-
son's disability under a statute prohibiting felons from carrying handguns, but
evidence of the conviction is hearsay when offered to show that the convicted
person actually committed the crime that led to conviction.
Utterances that are "performative" in the Mueller sense, but that are not
offered as operative language to show operative effect, can have the same infir-
mities as utterances that are clearly hearsay. His concept of "performatives"
includes verbal communications offered for an inference about the belief of the
declarant, for the further inference that the belief was accurate.26 It includes
utterances offered for that two-step inference that are made in circumstances
where the declarant would have been aware of the likelihood that someone would
draw the inference.
24. Mueller, supra note 15, at 420.
25. Mueller, supra note 15, at 421.
26. Mueller, supra note 15, at 421.
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I agree with Professor Mueller that performative utterances are analogous to
nonverbal conduct. But I do not agree that verbal Mueller-performatives offered
to show declarant's belief should be treated in the same way as nonverbal
nonassertive conduct offered to show the actor's belief. An actor's nonverbal acts
often, though not always, take place in circumstances that obviate dangers of
insincerity and that involve significant reliance by the actor on the belief mani-
fested by the conduct. Consider Baron Parke's hypothetical of the ship captain
who boards a ship with his family after inspecting it, his conduct being offered to
show that the ship was seaworthy.2 7 It is unlikely that the captain sought to mis-
lead observers about the safety of the ship, and the captain's reliance on his own
judgment is manifest. I am not sure that verbal Mueller-performatives offered to
show belief as often involve the same sort of reliance or the same safeguards
against insincerity. Moreover, the strongest reason to exempt nonassertive non-
verbal conduct is that lawyers seldom realize that testimony about it might be
objectionable on hearsay grounds. Rules excluding such conduct as hearsay
would be arbitrary because they would be applied sporadically. This considera-
tion does not apply when verbal conduct is involved. When an opponent seeks to
question a witness about what someone said out of court, any functioning lawyer
will be alert to the possibility of a hearsay objection.
In their textbook,28 Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick give the example of the
warning "Don't trip on the curb."29 They indicate that, when offered to show the
existence of the hazard, the performative aspect of the statement makes it non-
hearsay because it fits the concept of nonassertive conduct.30 I think the real rea-
son that nonhearsay treatment is attractive is that under the circumstances the
evidence does not present strong hearsay risks (indeed, even if classified as
hearsay it would be admissible as a present sense impression). Suppose that the
warning had been about a hazard that the declarant had observed on another
occasion, or the inference that the condition was hazardous required the declar-
ant to exercise sophisticated judgment. For example, suppose that the declarant's
warning "Don't trip the lever" was offered to show that a machine was dangerous
when its lever was tripped, or the utterance "Don't go to Dr. Curb" was offered to
show that the declarant had seen Dr. Curb botch a surgical procedure. Those
utterances have as much of a performative aspect as "Don't trip on the curb," but
I would hope to see them classified as hearsay when offered for a two-step infer-
ence to belief and the accuracy of the belief.
Professor Mueller's ample gifts as a scholar and explicator make it hard to
foreclose the possibility that he will develop his approach in a way that clarifies
the concept of hearsay. Perhaps I am a victim of "Law Professor's Disease,"31 but
27. "[T]he conduct of a deceased captain on a question of seaworthiness, who, after examining every part of
the vessel, embarked in it with his family." Wright v. Tatham, 112 Eng. Rep. 488, 516 (1837).
28. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 8.22 (1995).
29. Id. at 1114.
30. Id. at 1117.
31. See Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule ofAdmission, 76 MINN. L. REv. 797,
805 (1992) ("The most common symptom of Law Professor's Disease is an extremely close and critical analysis
of an unfavored position, followed by the assertion of some more favored alternative, which remains untouched
by the ferocious critical capacity previously demonstrated by the author.").
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I nonetheless fear that his broad concept of "performatives" will turn out to be no
more helpful than its spiritual ancestors "verbal act" and "res gestae." I would be
happier just telling judges that when the formula "offered for the truth of the
matter asserted" does not provide clear guidance, then they should look to
hearsay policy in deciding how to classify the utterance.
V
Craig Callen has argued for a "general intent" approach to hearsay definition.32
In doing so, he has brought to our attention some thought-provoking literature on
the nature of communication, and has analyzed the problem intelligently and
thoroughly.
The impressive body of knowledge that he brings to the treatment of communi-
cations is, I think, an embarrassment of riches in its application to the core hypo-
thetical that he discussed in his leading article in the Vanderbilt Law Review.33
The hypothetical was one in which a sarcastic utterance was offered into evi-
dence to prove the fact that the declarant apparently intended to convey.34
Professor Callen indicated that a mechanical application of the "literalist heuris-
tic" could lead to classification of the statement as nonhearsay.3" Thus, the utter-
ance "Well, at least I didn't forge a will" might be regarded as nonhearsay when
offered to show that the declarant was accusing the addressee of forging a will.
I doubt that a jurist using an assertion-oriented or "literalist" approach would
actually say that a sarcastic statement was not hearsay on grounds that it asserted
the opposite of what it was being offered to prove. Were judges treating sarcastic
statements as nonhearsay, there would be evidence of it in the case law. There is
plenty of sterile formalism surrounding the hearsay rule, but no one seems to
have carried it that far. To reach the common-sense result, a court need only hold
that when the proponent asks the trier to believe that the words "ABC" were
meant as an assertion of fact PF, then the words "ABC" are offered for their
truth when offered to show PF.
Professor Callen was correct, however, in pointing out that there are cases in
which the form of the utterance may have been given undue importance, at least
in the court's statement of the rule that it purported to be applying. 6 There are
judicial opinions suggesting that questions cannot be hearsay or that orders can-
32. Callen, supra note 19, at 113.
33. Callen, supra note 19, at 113.
34. Professor Callen sets forth the hypothetical as follows:
Suppose a murder defendant were to claim that the police mishandled evidence at the scene of the
crime and falsely accused him. Defendant offers the statement of Reporter, a since-deceased veter-
an of the police beat, to show that the forensics officer at the scene, Daryl, damaged the evidence, a
shell casing, in a way that prejudiced the defendant. A witness heard Reporter say to the officer
"Yup. Way to go, Daryl, way to handle the shell casing flawlessly." The witness says that Reporter
"seemed to be sort of a wise-acre about it." The central question for this Article is whether
Reporter's statement would be hearsay to show that Officer Daryl mishandled the evidence.
Callen, supra note 19, at 49-50.
35. Callen, supra note 19, at 50.
36. Callen, supra note 19, at 110.
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not be hearsay, on grounds that questions and orders are not assertive." These
suggestions tend to be made in cases in which the form of the utterance, com-
bined with the circumstances, make it sensible to admit the evidence. The cir-
cumstance that an utterance takes the form of a question or command can indeed,
in context, make the utterance better evidence than a "literal" direct declarative
sentence would be. The utterance "Could you stop whistling?" would normally
be better evidence that the addressee was whistling than the utterance "You are
whistling." The second utterance is more likely to be metaphor, sarcasm, a ver-
bal mishap, or an attempt to obtain confirmation of that which the speaker
doubts. However, a flat rule that a sentence that is formally a question or order
can never be an assertion is too broad and ought to be rejected.
After describing literature setting forth Grice's cooperative communication the-
ory, Professor Callen glossed the assertion-oriented definition by stating that a
communication should be considered to be hearsay "(i) if the proponent offers it
to establish any inference that the actor generally would have intended the audi-
ence to draw from the communication, and (ii) if assessment of the degree of
accuracy of the actor's implicit claim of co-operation would be essential to a
thoughtful, unprejudiced factfinder's determination of the inference's
reliability."3 He wrote that the statements in Wright v. Tatham (and "probably"
in Kearley) would be hearsay under this approach.39 An utterance offered as a
falsehood would not be hearsay, even though it depends for value upon the credi-
bility of the declarant.4"
I believe that the Callen approach is basically sound, though it has not yet been
stated in a way that will make it easy for judges to understand or apply. It points
toward sensible results. If a statement is arguably inadmissible under the asser-
tion-oriented definition (i.e., flunks the first part of the Callen test), then it is to
be evaluated under the second part of the Callen test, which seems close to being
a form of qualified "dangers analysis." The "implicit claim of co-operation" in
the second part of the Callen test appears to refer to a communicator's claim to
be offering something useful, true, and to the point.4 That claim may be wrong,
and if so it is wrong because "hearsay dangers" are present - because the trier
would have to rely significantly on the memory, perception, sincerity, or narra-
tive ability of the communicator.
Professor Callen's definition does not clearly convey to me how he would treat
an utterance that is being used at trial in a way in which the declarant would not
have expected the intended audience to use it. Suppose that the fact that the
declarant called and said "Put $100 on Tucson Don in the 9th" is offered for the
inference that the intended auditor was a bookmaker. Is this an inference that the
37. See United States v. Oguns, 921 E2d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1990) (intercepted message asking whether
"apples" had arrived; court endorses proposition that "an inquiry is not an 'assertion' "); United States v. Zenni,
492 E Supp. 464, 466 n.7 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (intercepted attempt to place bet; court indicates that a "direction" is
not an "assertion").
38. Callen, supra note 19 at 86-87.
39. Callen, supra note 19, at 101-02, 109.
40. Callen, supra note 19, at 61.
41. Callen, supra note 19, at 61.
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declarant "generally would have intended the audience to draw from the commu-
nication?" If so, the first prong of the Callen test does not add much to the sec-
ond prong.
I believe that my approach to interpreting the "truth of the matter asserted"
definition is pretty close to that urged by Professor Callen. I am, however, per-
haps a bit more ready to classify requests for illegal activity as nonhearsay than
is Professor Callen. Consider the situation in which police raid an establishment
and intercept calls, the calls later being used to incriminate the defendant. Here
it seems to me that Grice's maxims support the proposition that requests for ille-
gal activity ought to ordinarily be treated as better evidence than explicit accusa-
tions of criminal conduct. An explicit accusation (for example, "You are a book-
maker") made in the apparent belief that the declarant was talking to the defen-
dant, would carry the implicit message that the speaker wanted confirmation of
something that was in doubt, or wanted to assert something that the addressee
might well deny. Similarly, had a caller-declarant said directly "Kearley is a drug
dealer," the message would have been that the caller knew she was talking to
someone other than Kearley and believed that she was providing helpful infor-
mation. The information would be helpful, in the caller's cooperative assump-
tion, if the caller believed the information about illegal activity otherwise avail-
able to the auditor to be deficient. Were she convinced that the other evidence
was overwhelming, she would not have made the explicit accusation because to
do so would have violated the Gricean maxims of economy and utility.
Undoubtedly everything depends on context; one cannot give a statement
meaning in isolation. But given the right surrounding context, the difference
between explicit accusations and utterances offered for an indirect inference has
a bearing on reliability, and the difference seems to be one that the federal rule-
makers wanted us to think was significant.
VI.
The law of "implied assertions" is not in grave need of reform. A scholar
eager to improve the accuracy, speed, or efficiency of trials would choose another
topic. As someone whose ostensible goal is to write about rules and how to
improve them, perhaps I should be working on something else. However, the
implied assertion puzzle is simply a delight in itself, as this Symposium proves.
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